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Abstract
We consider a social choice problem where only a small number of people out
of a large population are sufficiently available or motivated to vote. A common
solution to increase participation is to allow voters use a proxy, that is, transfer
their voting rights to another voter. Considering social choice problems on metric
spaces, we compare voting with and without the use of proxies to see which mech-
anism better approximates the optimal outcome, and characterize the regimes in
which proxy voting is beneficial.
When voters’ opinions are located on an interval, both the median mechanism
and the mean mechanism are substantially improved by proxy voting. When voters
vote on many binary issues, proxy voting is better when the sample of active voters
is too small to provide a good outcome. Our theoretical results extend to situations
where available voters choose strategically whether to participate. We support our
theoretical findings with empirical results showing substantial benefits of proxy
voting on simulated and real preference data.
1 Introduction
In his 1969 paper, James Miller envisioned a world where technology enables people to
vote from their homes [18]. With the rise of participatory democracies, the formation
of many overlapping online communities, and the increasing use of polls by companies
and service providers, this vision is turning into reality.
New online voting apps provide an easy way for people to report and aggregate
their preferences, from simple direct polls (such as those used by Facebook and Doo-
dle), through encrypted large-scale applications (e.g. electionbuddy.com), to
sophisticated tools that use AI to guide group selection, such as robovote.org. As
a result, each of us is prompted to vote in various formats multiple times a day: we vote
for our union members and approve their decisions, on meeting times, and even on the
temperature in our office.1
Is direct democracy coming back? Can it replace representative democracy and par-
liaments? As it turns out, many online voting instances and polls have low participation
rates [5, 15], presumably since most people consider them insignificant, low-priority,
1http://design-milk.com/comfy-app- brings-group-voting-workplace-thermostat.
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or simply a burden. The actual decisions in many of these polls are often taken by
a small group of dedicated and active voters, with little or no involvement from most
people who could have voted. The outcome in such cases may be completely unrepre-
sentative for the entire population, e.g. if the motivation of the active voters depends
on their position or other factors. Even if the set of active voters is selected at random
and is thus representative in expectation, there may be too few voters for a reliable
outcome. For example, Mueller et al. [20] argue that to function well, such a “random
democracy” would require over 1000 representatives.
Proxy voting lets voters who are unable or uninterested to vote themselves transfer
their voting rights to another person—a proxy. Proxy voting is common in politics
and in corporates [23], and plays an important role in existing and planned systems for
e-voting and participatory democracies [21]. Yet there is only a handful of theoretical
models dealing with proxy voting, and our understanding of its effects are limited (see
Discussion).
In this paper, we model voters’ positions as points in a metric space aggregated
by some function g (specifically, Median, Mean, or Majority). For example, a voter’s
position may be her preferred pension policy in the union’s negotiation with manage-
ment (say, how much to save on a scale of 0 to 10). The optimal policy is an aggregate
over the preferences of all employees. Since actively participating in union’s meeting
costs time and effort, we consider a subset of active voters selected from the population
(either at random or by strategic self-selection), and ask whether the accuracy can be
improved by allowing inactive voters to use a proxy at no cost. Following Tullock [27],
we weigh the few active voters (who are used as proxies) according to their number of
followers, and assume that inactive voters select the “nearest” active voter as a proxy.
For example, a person who is unable to attend the next union meeting could use an on-
line app to select a colleague with similar preferences as her proxy, thereby increasing
his weight and influencing the outcome in her direction.
The intuition for why proxy voting should increase accuracy is straight-forward:
opinions that are more “central” or “representative” would attract followers and gain
weight, whereas the weight of “outliers” that distort the outcome will be demoted.
However as we will see, this reasoning does not always work in practice.Thus it is
important to understand the conditions in which proxy voting is expected to improve
accuracy, especially when voters behave strategically.
1.1 Contribution and Structure
We dedicate one section to each common mechanism, and show via theorems and
empirical results that proxy voting usually has a significant positive effect on accuracy,
and hence welfare. For the Median mechanism on a line (Section 3), proxy voting
may only increase the accuracy, often substantially. For the Mean mechanism on a line
(Section 4), we show improvement in expectation if active voters are sampled from the
population at random. The last domain contains multiple independent binary issues,
where a Majority vote is applied to each issue (Section 5). Here we show that proxy
voting essentially leads to a “dictatorship of the best expert,” which increases accuracy
when the sample is small and/or when voters have high disagreements. Interestingly,
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results on real preference data are even more positive, and we analyze the reasons in
the text. We further characterize equilibria outcomes when voters strategically choose
whether to become active (i.e., use as proxies), and show that most of our results extend
this strategic setting. Results are summarized in Table 1.
2 Preliminaries
X is the space, or set of possible voter’s preferences, or types. In this paperX ⊆ Rk for
some k ≥ 1 dimensions, thus each type can be thought of as a position in space. We use
the `ρ distance metric on X . In particular, we will consider two spaces: an unknown
intervalX = [a, b] for some a, b ∈ R∪{±∞}, and multiple binary issuesX = {0, 1}k.
Note that this means that all `ρ norms coincide (not true e.g. for X = R2).
We assume an infinite population of voters, that is given by a distribution f over X .
We say that f over the interval [a, b] is symmetric if there is a point c s.t. f(c − x) =
f(c+x) for all x. We say that f over the interval [a, b] is [weakly] single-peaked if there
is a point c ∈ X s.t. f is [weakly] increasing in [min a, z] and [weakly] decreasing in
[z, b]. f is single-dipped if the function −f is single-peaked. For example, (truncated)
Normal distributions are single-peaked, and Uniform distributions are weakly single
peaked. We denote the cumulative distribution function corresponding to f by F (X) =
Prz∼f (z < x).
Mechanisms A mechanism g : Xn → X (also called a voting rule) is a function that
maps any profile (set of positions) to a winning position.
Two particular mechanisms we will consider for the interval setting are the Mean
mechanism,mn(S) = 1|S|
∑
si∈S si, and the Median mechanism,md(S) = min{si ∈
S s.t. |{j : sj ≤ si}| ≥ |{j : sj > si}| (see Fig. 1).
For the binary issues we will focus on a simple Majority mechanism that aggregates
each issue independently according to the majority of votes. That is, (mj(S))(j) = 1
if |{i : s(j)i = 1}| > |{i : s(j)i = 0}| and 0 otherwise, where s(j) is the j’th entry of
position vector s. In all mechanisms we break ties lexicographically towards the lower
outcome.
All of our three mechanisms naturally extend to such infinite populations, as the
Median, Mean, and Majority of f (in their respective domains) are well defined. The
mechanisms also extend to weighted finite populations. E.g. for n agents with positions
S and weights w = {w1, . . . , wn}, the weighted mean is defined as mn(S,w) ≡
1∑
i≤n wj
∑
i≤n wisi, and similarly for the Median and Majority.
In our model, a finite subsetN of n agents are selected out of the whole population,
and only these agents can vote. We follow [20] in assuming that positions SN =
{s1, . . . , sn} are sampled i.i.d. from f . We can think of these as voters who happen to
be available at the time of voting, or voters for which this voting is important enough
to consider participation.
In our basic setup, the unavailable voters abstain, while all agents vote. The result
is g(SN ). Yet two problems may prevent us from getting a good outcome. First, N
may be too small for g(SN ), the decision made by the agents, to be a good estimation
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0 10
s1 = 1 s2 = 3 s3 = 6 s4 = 7
md(SN )
mn(SN ) = 4.25
w1 = 2 w2 = 2.5
w3 = 2 w4 = 3.5
md(SN ,wN )mn(SN ,wN ) = 4.6
w1 = 3.5
w3 = 3 w4 = 3.5
md(SM ,wM )mn(SM ,wM ) = 4.6
Figure 1: The top figure shows the preferences of 4 agents on an interval, as well as the
outcomes of the median and mean mechanisms. In the middle figure we see the weight
of each agent under proxy selection, assuming f is a uniform distribution on the whole
interval, as well as the modified outcomes. The bottom figure shows the outcome under
proxy voting if agent 2 becomes inactive, and M = {1, 3, 4}. The dotted line marks
mn(f) = md(f) = 5.
of g(f), the true preference of the population. Second, even selected agents may de-
cide not to vote due to various reasons, and such strategic participation may bias the
outcome. We will then have a set of active agents M ⊆ N , and the outcome g(SM )
may be very far from both g(SN ) and g(f), depending on the equilibrium outcome of
the induce game (later described in more detail).
Proxies and weights Our main focus in this paper is characterizing the regime in
which voting by proxy is beneficial. In this setup each inactive voter specifies one of
the active agents as a proxy to vote on her behalf. Given a set M of active agents,
the decisions of inactive voters are specified by a mapping JM : X → M , where
JM (x) ∈ M is the proxy of any voter located at x ∈ X . We label the Proxy setup
as P , in contrast to the Basic setup denoted as B. We highlight that all voters select a
proxy, whether they are part of N or not.
Without further constraints, we will assume that the proxy of a voter at x is always
its nearest active agent, i.e. the agent whose position (or preferences) are most similar
to x. Thus for every set M , we get a partition (a Voronoi tessellation) of X and can
compute the weight of each active agent j by integrating f over the corresponding
cell. Formally, JM (x) = argminj∈M ‖x− sj‖ and wj =
∫
x∈X :JM (x)=j f(x)dx. The
outcome of each mechanism g for agents N is then defined as gB(SN ) = g(SN ) in
the Basic scenario, and gP (SN ) = g(SN ,wN ) in the Proxy scenario, where wN is
computed according to f as above (see Fig. 1). The distribution f should be inferred
from the context.
Equilibrium under strategic participation In our strategic scenarios the agents N
are players in a complete information game, whose (ordinal) utility exactly matches
their preferences as voters. I.e., they prefer an outcome that is as close as possible to
their own position. Each agent has two actions: active and inactive. In addition, a voter
who is otherwise indifferent between the two possible outcomes (i.e. he is not pivotal)
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will prefer to remain inactive, a behavior known as lazy-bias [10]. We refer to these
strategic/lazy-bias scenarios by adding +L to eitherB or P . Agents may not misreport
their position.
When there are no proxies (scenario B+L) this strategic decision is very simple,
since each agent has a single vote which may or may not be pivotal (and when it is
pivotal it always helps the agent). On the other hand, if voting by proxy is allowed
(scenario P+L), any change in the set of active agents changes the proxy selection and
thus the weights of all remaining agents. Recall that wM denotes the weights we get
under proxy selection with active set M . Then for all i /∈M , agent i prefers to join set
M iff
∥∥g(SM∪{i},wM∪{i})− si∥∥ < ‖g(SM ,wM )− si‖.
For example, if agent 2 in Fig. 1 (bottom) becomes inactive, we get no change in
the Median outcome md(SM ,wM ), and thus agent 2 prefers to become inactive (it is
also possible that an agent strictly loses when becoming active).
A pure Nash equilibrium, or equilibrium for short, is a subset M ⊆ N s.t. no
agent in M prefers to be inactive, and no agent in N \M prefers to be active. While
it is possible that there are multiple equilibria (or none at all), this will turn out not to
be a problem in most cases we consider. We thus define gB+L(SN ) = g(SM ) and
gP+L(SN ) = g(SM ,wM ), where M ⊆ N is the set of active agents in equilibrium.
To recap, an instance is defined by a population distribution f , a scenario Q ∈
{B,P,B+L,P+L}, a mechanism g∈{md,mn,mj} and a sample size n. We sample
a finite profile of n agents i.i.d. from f , whose locations are SN . Then, according to the
scenario, either all of N are active, or we get a subset M of active agents. The votes
of all active agents are aggregated according to g, with or without being weighted
by wM, the number of their inactive followers. Finally, the outcome of mechanism
gQ(SN ) depends on a subset of these parameters, according to the scenario Q.
Evaluation We do not consider here the reasons for using one mechanism over an-
other, and simply assume that g(f) reflects the best possible outcome to the society or
to the designer. We want to measure how close is gQ(SN ) to the optimal outcome g(f).
We define the error as the distance between gQ(SN ) and g(f), i.e., ‖gQ(SN )−g(f)‖.
The loss of a mechanism g is calculated according to its expected error—the ex-
pected squared distance from the optimum—over all samples of m available voters.
LQ(n) = ESN∼fn
[‖gQ(SN )− g(f)‖2] , (1)
where the mechanism g and the distribution f can be inferred from the context, and
the expectation is over all subsets of n positions sampled i.i.d. from distribution f
(sometimes omitted from the subscript).
We note that the loss is the sum of two components [28]: the (squared) biasE[gQ(SN )−
g(f)]2 and the varianceV[gQ(SN )]. A mechanism g is unbiased for (Q, f) ifE[gQ(SN )] =
g(f). For example in the Basic scenario, mechanisms mn and mj are unbiased for
(B, f) regardless of f , and md is unbiased for (B, f) if f is symmetric, but not for
other (skewed) distributions.
Our primary goal is to characterize the conditions under which proxy voting im-
proves the outcome, i.e. LP [+L](n) < LB[+L](n).
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3 Median Voting on an Interval
The Median mechanism is popular for two primary reasons. First, it finds the point that
minimizes the sum of distances to all reported positions, i.e. md(S) ∈ argminx∈X
∑
si∈S |si−
x|. Second, in strategic settings where agents might misreport their positions, it is
known that the Median mechanism is group strategyproof [19], meaning that no subset
of agents can gain by misreporting.
3.1 Random participation
Suppose all n agents sampled from f are active. Let j∗ ∈ N be the proxy closest to
x∗ = md(f), and s∗ = sj∗ .
Lemma 1. mdP (SN ) = s∗ for any distribution f .
Proof. Recall that mdP (SN ) = md(SN ,w) where wj is the weight of voters using
j ∈ N as a proxy. All voters x ≥ md(f) are mapped to one of the proxies j∗, j∗ +
1, . . . , n, thus
∑n
j=j∗ ≥ 1/2 and md(SM ,w) ≥ s∗. Similarly, all voters x ≤ md(f)
are mapped to one of the proxies 1, 2, . . . , j∗, thus
∑j∗
j=1 ≥ 1/2 and md(SN ,w) ≤
s∗. Thus md(SN ,w) = s∗.
ThusmdP (SN ) always returns the proxy closest to x∗ = md(f), whereasmdB(SN )
returns some j ∈ N , meaning that the error is never higher with proxy voting. I.e.,
|mdP (S)− x∗| ≤ |mdB(S)− x∗| for any S. In particular, the loss (=expected error)
is weakly better.
Corollary 2. For the Median mechanism, LP (n) ≤ LB(n) for any distribution f and
sample size n.
Proof.
LP (n) = E[(mdP (SN )− x∗)2] ≤ E[(mdB(SN )− x∗)2] = LB(n).
Note that for symmetric distributions, both ofmdB(SN ) = md(SN ) andmdP (SN ) =
md(SN ,wN ) are unbiased from symmetry arguments. Therefore to compute or bound
the loss we just need to compute the variance of mdQ(SN ). For the unweighted me-
dian, this problem was solved by Laplace (see [25] for details): Let x∗ = md(f) be
the median of symmetric distribution f s.t. f(x∗) > 0.2 The variance of md(SN )
is given by (approximately) 14nf(x∗)2 = Θ(1/n). Since for any distribution the loss
(or MSE) is lower-bounded by the variance, we get that for the Median mechanism,
LB(n) = Ω( 1n ).
We argue that the loss decreases quadratically faster with the number of agents
once proxy voting is allowed.
2We will assume in this section that f(x) > 0 in some environment of x∗, which is a very weak
assumption.
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Conjecture 3. For the Median mechanism, LP (n) = O( 1n2 ) for any distribution f .
The rest of this section is dedicated to supporting this conjecture. In particular,
we prove it for symmetric distributions, and show empirically that it holds for other
distributions as well. Further, for Uniform and single-peaked distributions, we can
upper-bound the constant in the expression.
Theorem 4. For the Median mechanism, LP (n) = O( 1n2 ), for any symmetric distri-
bution f .
Proof. W.l.o.g. we can assume x∗ = 0, and that the support of f is the interval [−1, 1].
What is the expected distance between s∗ and md(f) = x∗ = 0? We can translate
each proxy xi to yi = |xi−x∗| = |xi|. Note that yi come from some distribution f ′ on
[0, 1]. By our assumption, f(x) is strictly positive in some  environment of x∗ = 0,
i.e. f(x) > α for all x ∈ [−, ], for some α,  > 0. We thus have that f ′(z) > α for
all z ≤ . Then for the cumulative distribution F ′(z), we have that F ′(z) > zα for all
z ≤ , and F ′(z) > α for all z > .
Recall that by Lemma 1, the error is exactly |s∗ − x∗| = |s∗|.
The random variable s∗ = min yi is the minimum of n variables sampled i.i.d.
from f ′[0, 1]. The distribution of the minimum is well known and in particular for all
z ∈ [0, 1],
Pr(s∗ > z) = (PrZ∼f ′[0,1](Z > z))n = (1− F ′(z))n.
For z = , we get Pr(s∗ > ) = (1− F ′())n ≤ (1− α)n.
There is some n s.t. for all n > n, Pr(s∗ > ) < 1n3 since the left terms drops
exponentially fast. Thus assume n > n. Let Tn = b2n · c
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LP (n) = V ARf [s∗] = Ef [(s∗)2] ≤
2n∑
t=1
Pr(s∗ ∈ [ t− 1
2n
,
t
2n
])(
t
2n
)2
(bound by steps)
=
Tn∑
t=1
Pr(s∗ ∈ [ t− 1
2n
,
t
2n
])(
t
2n
)2 +
2n∑
t=Tn+1
Pr(s∗ ∈ [ t− 1
2n
,
t
2n
])(
t
2n
)2
≤
Tn∑
t=1
Pr(s∗ ∈ [ t− 1
2n
,
t
2n
])(
t
2n
)2 +
2n∑
t=Tn+1
Pr(s∗ ∈ [ t− 1
2n
,
t
2n
])
≤
Tn∑
t=1
Pr(s∗ ∈ [ t− 1
2n
,
t
2n
])(
t
2n
)2 + Pr(s∗ > )
≤
Tn∑
t=1
Pr(s∗ ∈ [ t− 1
2n
,
t
2n
])(
t
2n
)2 +
1
n3
=
Tn∑
t=1
(Pr(s∗ >
t− 1
2n
)− Pr(s∗ > t
2n
))(
t
2n
)2 +
1
n3
≤
Tn∑
t=1
Pr(s∗ >
t− 1
2n
)(
t
2n
)2 +
1
n3
≤ 1
4n2
Tn∑
t=1
Pr(s∗ >
t− 1
2n
)t2 +
1
n3
≤ 1
4n2
Tn∑
t=1
(1− F ′( t− 1
2n
))nt2 +
1
n3
≤ 1
4n2
Tn∑
t=1
(1− αt− 1
2n
)nt2 +
1
n3
≤ 1
4n2
Tn∑
t=1
e−α
t−1
2 t2 +
1
n3
=
1
4n2
Tn∑
t=1
e−Θ(t)t2 +
1
n3
<
1
4n2
C +
1
n3
= O(
1
n2
),
where C is some constant.
Further, for Uniform f = U [−1, 1] we can derive a tighter bound on the sum of
the series and show LP (n) < 4n2 . In fact for any single-peaked f on [−1, 1] we haveLP (n) < 7n2 .
We simulated the effect of proxy voting on the Median mechanism in Figure 2.
We can see that the (log of the) loss for each distribution closely resembles log( cn2 ) =
c′− 2 log(n), where the constant c′ depends on the distribution. This also holds for the
asymmetric distributions, which supports our Conjecture 3. In particular, this means
that the loss under proxy voting drops much faster than the loss in the Basic scenario,
which is roughly 1n .
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Proxy accuracy, Median mechanism
log(1/n2)
Beta(0.3,0.3)  [SD,symm]
Beta(1,1) [Uniform]
Beta(4,4)   [SP,symm]
Beta(4,1)  [SP]
Beta(3,0.3)
Normal(0,1)  [SP,symm]
Figure 2: The top figure shows LQ(n) (in log scale) as a function of n for various
distributions. SP/SD/symm stands for Single-peaked / Single-dipped/ Symmetric dis-
tributions. Each point is based on 1000 samples of size n.
3.2 Strategic participation
We show that when participation is strategic the outcome of proxy voting is not af-
fected, whereas the unweighted sample median becomes unboundedly worse. Suppose
all voters inN are indexed in increasing order by their location, so that argminSN = 1.
Proposition 5. In the Basic scenario, for any distribution f and any set of agents N ,
there is a unique equilibrium of mdB+L where M = {1} (i.e., the lowest agent).
Further, the game is weakly acyclic, i.e. there is a sequence of best replies from any
initial state to this equilibrium.
Clearly this means that LB+L(n) < LB(n), and only gets worse as we increase
the sample size n.
The intuition is that due to tie-breaking, either all agents below current median, or
all agents above it, are non-pivotal.
Proof. Note first that if M = {1} then the single active agent is pivotal by definition.
Any other agent i > 1 is non-pivotal since md({s1, si}) = s1 by our tie-breaking
assumption, thus M = {1} is an equilibrium.
Consider any subset of active agents M ⊆ N s.t. |M | > 1. If m is even, then all
agents above the median g(M) are non-pivotal. If m is odd then all agents below the
median are non-pivotal. Thus there is at least one agent in M who prefers to become
inactive. This continues until |M | = 1.
Finally, ifM = {i} for some i > 1, we have the following sequence of best-replies:
any agent j < i is pivotal, and in particular j = 1. Thus agent 1 will become active.
Now agent i is no longer pivotal so becomes inactive.
On the other hand, while lazy bias decreases participation in the Proxy scenario,
this does not increase the loss.
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Theorem 6. In the Proxy scenario, for any distribution f and any set of agents N ,
there is a unique equilibrium of mdP+L where M = {j∗} (the agent closest to x∗).
Further, the game is weakly acyclic, i.e. there is a sequence of best replies from any
initial state to this equilibrium.
In particular, LP+L(n) = LP (n) for any distribution f .
Proof. If j∗ /∈M is inactive, then for M ∪ {j∗} the outcome becomes sj∗ rather than
sk (where k = JM (x∗)), which j∗ prefers. If j∗ is active, and j 6= j∗ quits, then all
votes above sj∗ are still mapped to j∗ or higher (and similarly for votes below sj∗ ).
Thus the outcome remains the same which means j is not pivotal.
4 Mean Voting on an Interval
The Mean mechanism is perhaps the simplest and most common way to aggregate
positions. For positions SN on the interval the outcome is mn(SN ) = 1n
∑
i∈N si,
which is known to minimize the sum of square distances to all agents.
4.1 Random Participation
Assume that f is a symmetric distribution, so that mnQ(SN ) is unbiased under all
scenarios. When we apply the Mean mechanism, the loss in the basic scenario is simply
the sample variance.
Proposition 7. Let f be a symmetric, weakly single-peaked distribution, and suppose
|N | = 2. Then, for any SN , ‖mnP (SN )− x∗‖ ≤ ‖mnB(SN )− x∗‖. That is, for any
pair of agents the proxy-weighted mean is weakly better than the unweighted mean.
Proof. Suppose w.l.o.g. that the support of f is [−1, 1], that f is symmetric around
x∗ = 0, that s1 < s2, and that x = mn(SN ) = s1+s22 ≥ 0. Then for the basic
(unweighted) scenario,
‖mnB(SN )− x∗‖ = |mnB(SN )| = |mn(SN )| = |x| = x.
Since f(·) in single-peaked, the CDF F (·) is convex in [−1, 0] and concave in [0, 1],
thus for all z ≥ 0, F (z) ≥ z+12 . In particular F (x) ≥ x+12 .
In the proxy (weighted) scenario, agent 1 gets all voters below point x, i.e. w1 =
F (x), whereas w2 = 1− F (x). Thus
mn(SN ,w) = w1s1 + w2s2 = F (xˆ)s1 + (1− F (xˆ))s2
= s2 + F (xˆ)(s1 − s2) ≤ s2 + xˆ+ 1
2
(s1 − s2) (as s1 − s2 < 0)
=
s1 + s2
2
+ xˆ
s1 − s2
2
= xˆ+ xˆ
s1 − s2
2
= xˆ(1 +
s1 − s2
2
) ∈ [−xˆ, xˆ]. ⇒ (since −1 ≤ s1−s2
2
< 0)
‖mnP (SN )− x∗‖ = |mn(SN ,w)| ≤ |xˆ| = ‖mnB(SN )− x∗‖,
as required.
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Proof sketch. Suppose w.l.o.g. that the support of f is [−1, 1], that f is symmetric
around x∗ = 0, that s1 < s2, and that xˆ = mn(SN ) = s1+s22 ≥ 0. Then for the basic
(unweighted) scenario, ‖mnB(SN )− x∗‖ = |mnB(SN )| = |mn(SN )| = |xˆ| = xˆ.
Since f in single-peaked, F is convex in [−1, 0] and concave in [0, 1], thus for all
z ≥ 0, F (z) ≥ z+12 . In particular F (xˆ) ≥ xˆ+12 .
In the proxy (weighted) scenario, agent 1 gets all voters below point xˆ, i.e. w1 =
F (xˆ), whereasw2 = 1−F (xˆ). We can compute the weights and show thatmn(SN ,w) =
(1 + s1−s22 ) ∈ [−x, x].
This means that ‖mnP (SN )− x∗‖ = |mn(SN ,w)| ≤ |xˆ|, i.e. weakly better than
mnB(SN ).
For larger sets of agents this is not true in general. Even for the Uniform distribu-
tion there are examples with more agents where proxy voting leads to a less accurate
outcome:
0 1mn(SN ) =
1
2∗
mn(SN ,wN ) =
17
32
∗
Consider 3 agents onX = [0, 1], located at SN = { 14 , 14 , 1}. For a Uniform distribution
f , the optimal outcome is x∗ = mn(f) = 12 . In the Basic scenario, mn
B(SN ) =
1
2
while with proxies,
mnP (SN ) = mn
P (SN ,wN = { 58 , 0, 38}) = 14 58 + 1 38 = 1732 .
The question is under which distributions f the loss is improved on average by
weighing the samples. We show analytically that this holds for uniform distributions
and provide similar simulation results for other distributions.
Uniform distribution Consider the uniform distribution over the interval [−1, 1]
(w.l.o.g., as we can always rescale). In the Basic scenario, we know from [3] that
LB(n) = V[mn(SN )] = 13n . The next proposition indicates that the loss under proxy
voting decreases quadratically faster than without proxies (as with the median mecha-
nism).
Proposition 8. For the Mean mechanism, when f = U [−1, 1],
LP (SN ) = 8n2 (1 +O( 1n )).
Proof. We first note that the weighted meanmn (SN ,wN ), is an unbiased estimator of
the distribution mean from symmetry argument, and thereforeLP (SN ) = V[mn(SN ,wN )].
We now turn to evaluate this term. V[mn(SN )] = E
[
(mn(SN ))
2
]
.
mn (SN ,wN ) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
wjsj
Here wj is the number of voters that elect representative j as their proxy. Since the
number of vote n is large, wα is the corresponding share of the probability distribution,
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In the Uniform distribution U [−1, 1] we can compute the weights:
wj = F
(
sj+1 + sj
2
)
− F
(
sj−1 + sj
2
)
=
1
2
(
sj+1 + sj
2
− (−1)) + 1
2
(
sj−1 + sj
2
− (−1)) = 1
4
(sj+1 − sj−1)
where we set s0 = −2−s1, sn+1 = 2−sn for convenience. Thereforemn (SN ,wN )
can be written as
n∑
i=1
wjsj =
1
4
∑
sj (sj+1 − sj−1) = sn + s1
2
+
s21 − s2n
4
(2)
by telescopic cancellation. Here sn and s1 are the two extremes representatives. Now,
since the joint distribution of (s1, sn) is explicitly known [3],
Pr (s1 = x, sn = y) = n · (n− 1) ·
(
1
2
)2
·
(
y − x
2
)n−2
it is possible to evaluate it precisely by integration. We get
E
[
mn (SN ,w)
2
]
=
2((n− 5)n+ 14)n · (n− 1)∏6
t=1(n+ t)
=
2
n2
(
1 +O(n−1)
)
.
=
2
n2
(
1 +O(
1
n
)
)
.
We should note that the estimator s1+sn2 is known to minimize the MSE for the
uniform distribution. It is interesting that the estimator obtained by proxy voting is so
similar.
Recall that s1+sn2 is the maximum likelihood estimator of E[f ] = mn(f) for the
uniform distribution, and V [s1 + sn] = 2n2
(
1 +O( 1n )
)
, which means that LP/LB →
4.
While proxy voting may have adverse effect on the mean in specific samples, our
proof shows that on average, proxy voting leads to a substantial gain under the Uniform
distribution. Other common distributions displayed the same effect. Fig. 3 shows proxy
voting leads to a substantial improvement over the unweighted mean of active voters
for various distributions.
4.2 Strategic participation
In the basic (non-proxy) scenario, it is easy to see that every voter is always pivotal with
any active set unless si = mn(M). Thus in every equilibrium M ⊆ N , mn(SM ) =
mn(SN ), and for any distribution f , and LB+L(n) = LB(n).
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Figure 3: The ratio of LB(n) and LP (n) (in log scale) as a function of n.
In the proxy setting things get more involved. The following lemma analyzes the
best response of agents in cases where the voter’s population is monotonic is some
region.
Lemma 9. (A) It is a dominant strategy for both argmini {SN} and argmaxi {SN} to
be active;
(B) Consider three agents, s1 < s2 < s3 s.t. {1, 3} ⊆ M . Suppose f is strictly
decreasing in [s1, s3]. Agent 2 prefers to be active if mn
(
SM∪{s2}
)
< s2, and prefers
to be inactive if mn
(
SM\{s2}
) ≥ s2. The reverse condition applies for increasing f .
If f is constant, agent 2 always prefer to be inactive.
Proof. (A) is obvious. For (B), consider a set of active agentsM− such that {s1, s3} ⊆
M− and s2 /∈ M−. Define M+ = M− ∪ {s2}. The population decision boundary
points are the intermediate points between the different agents α = (s1 + s2) /2, γ =
(s2 + s3) /2 and β = (s1 + s3) /2. The result of the decision mechanism is denoted
as gM− , or correspondingly, gM+ . We note that mn (SM+)−mn (SM−) equals
(s2 − s1)
∫ β
α
f(x)d(x) + (s2 − s3)
∫ γ
β
f(x)d(x).
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a point x1 ∈ [α, β] such that∫ β
α
f(x)d(x) = (β − α) f(x1) = (s3−s2)f(x1)2 .
Similarly, there is x2 ∈ [β, γ] such that∫ γ
β
f(x)d(x) = (s2−s1)f(x2)2 . Therefore,
mn(SM+)−mn(SM−) = (s2−s1) (s3−s2) (f(x1)−f(x2))2 (3)
This expression is positive if f (x1) > f (x2). If f is monotonic decreasing in
[s1, s3] this holds, while if f is monotonic increasing we havemn (SM+) <mn (SM−) .
If mn (SM−) < s2 and f is increasing, it is not beneficial for s2 to become active.
Likewise, if mn (SM−) > s2 and f is monotonic decreasing s2 will not be active.
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Finally, if f is constant, then f(x1) = f(x2) and agent s2 does not affect the result and
will be inactive.
Before considering general probability distributions, we apply the previous lemma
for the particular case of the uniform distribution. We show that even when the voters
are strategic, the result equilibrium is the optimal configuration.
Proposition 10. In the Proxy scenario, for the Uniform distribution and any set of
agentsN , there is a unique equilibrium ofmnP+L whereM = {argminSN , argmaxSN}
(i.e., the two extreme agents). Further, the game is weakly acyclic, i.e. there is a se-
quence of best replies from any initial state to this equilibrium.
Proof. Lemma 9(A) says it is beneficial that the two most extreme agents to be active.
Due to Part (B), all other agents will quit.
Our last result for uniform distributions shows that strategic behavior, despite low-
ering the number of active agents, leads to a more accurate outcome than in the non-
strategic case. In fact, it can be shown that no other estimator outperforms mnP+L for
the Uniform distribution.
Corollary 11. For the Mean mechanism, for any sample SN , under the unique equilib-
rium ofmnP+L for Uniform f ,mnP+L(SN ) = mnP (SN ). In particular,LP+L(n) =
LP (n).
Proof. w.l.o.g. f = U [−1, 1]. For any sample SN , let SM = {s1, sn} contain the
two extreme samples. Let wM = (w∗1 , w
∗
n) denote the weights of these samples under
proxy voting, when there are no other agents. We have that
mnP+L(SN ) = mn(SM ,wM ) =
1
2
(s1w
∗
1 + snw
∗
n)
=
1
2
(
s1
(
s1 + sn
2
+ 1
)
+ sn
(
1− s1 + sn
2
))
=
s1 + sn
2
+
s21 − s2n
4
= mn(SN ,wN ) = mn
P (SN ), (by Eq. (2))
as required.
We now turn to analyze more general distributions, and we first focus on the single
peak case. Denote the peak location as x, the smallest agent in [x,∞] as s+ and
the largest agent in [−∞, x] as s−. Set α = (s+ + s−) /2 as the intermediate point
between s+ and s−. Assume, w.l.o.g, that f (s−) ≥ f (s+). We call a given set of
agents M an equitable partition if mnP (SM ) ∈ [s−, s+] and f(A) ≥ f(s+) (Fig.
4(a)).
Proposition 12. Consider a single peaked distribution f and a profile SN . If SN is an
equitable partition, then there is an equilibrium of mnP+L where all agents are active
M = N . In particular, the error is the same as in mnP .
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Figure 4: a) An equitable partition of a a single peaked distribution. b) A feasible
equilibrium in a single dip scenario. Note that in both cases the distribution is not
necessarily symmetric.
Proof. Consider the set M = N . Following Eq. 3, s+ will not quit from the active set
if (s2 − s1) (s3 − s2) (f(x1)− f(x2)) > 0.
We shall now show that f(x1) > f(s+). Assume A < x. As f(A) ≥ f(s+),
for every y ∈ [A, x] we have f(y) > f(A) ≥ f(s+) as f is increasing in [A, x].
Likewise, f(y) > f(s+) as f is decreasing in [x, s+] therefore f(x1), the mean value
of f in [A, s+] satisfies f(x1) > f(s+). Now, f(s+) > f(x2) as f is monotonic
decreasing in [x,∞]. Therefore, the former expression is positive, and s+ will stay in
the equilibrium set.
Now, Lemma 9(A) shows that the most extreme agents s1, sn will be active, while
Lemma9 (B) shows every agent between [s+, sn] and [s1, s−] are also active. Namely,
all the agents are active.
This shows that proxy voting may achieve maximal participation in a single peak
setup. Next, we address the single dip setting.
Proposition 13. Consider a single dipped distribution where the dip location is x.
Consider any equilibrium M ⊆ N , and assume w.l.o.g that mn (SM ) ≤ x. Then,
M contains at most two agents in [min (SN ) ,mn (SM )] and at most two agents in
[mn (SM ) ,max (SN )].
Proof. Lemma 9(A) shows that the two most extreme agents s1, sn are always ac-
tive. Denote the dip location as x. Consider some active agents set M , and assume
mn (SM ) ≤ x. Lemma 9(B) shows that there can not be more than two agent in
[x, sn] and [s1,mn (SM )]. Consider an equilibrium set that contain active agents in
A =[mn (SM ) , x]. Denote the maximal active agent in A as y. Then Lemma 9(B) in-
dicates that all agents in [mn (SM ) , y] are active, while there is only one active agent
in [s1,mn (SM )], which is s1.
If there are no active agent inA, then Lemma 9(B) show that are at most two agents
in [s1,mn (SM )] and in [s, sn].
We see the possible emergence of four active agents, or parties, at the center-right,
center-left, extreme right and extreme left. If the distribution is heavily skewed, we
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expect some parties to emerge between the dip location and the decision rule, balancing
the result.
5 Binary Issues
In this section X = {0, 1}k and mj(S) outputs a binary vector according to the ma-
jority on each issue. In the most general case, f can be an arbitrary distribution over
{0, 1}k. However, we assume that issues are conditionally independent in the follow-
ing way: first a number P is drawn from a distribution h over [0, 1], and then the
position on each issue is ‘1’ w.p. P . That is, the position of a voter on all issues is
(s(1), . . . , s(k)), where s(j) are random variables sampled i.i.d from a Bernoulli distri-
bution Ber(P ), and P is a random variable sampled from h. Since h induces f we
sometimes use them interchangeably.
Evaluation W.l.o.g. denote the majority opinion on each issue as 0, meaning that
x∗ = mj(f) = (0, 0, . . . , 0). The expected rate of ‘1’ opinions is µ ≡ EP∼h[P ] < 0.5.
One interpretation of this model is that 0 is the ground truth, and Pi is the probability
that agent i is wrong at any issue. Under this interpretation 1−µ is the signal strength
that the population has on the truth. In the lack of ground truth, the majority opinion is
considered optimal. Here Pi is the probability that agent i disagrees with the majority
at each issue. The error of a given outcome z ∈ {0, 1}k is then ‖z − x∗‖ = ∑kj=1 z(j)
(coincides with the Hamming distance between z and x∗). The loss is the expected
error over samples as before.
We argue that when society has limited information (small sample size n and high
mistakes probability µ), then scenario P does better than scenario B, i.e. LP (n) <
LB(n).
5.1 Random participation
Suppose that each agent is wrong w.p. exactly µ < 0.5, i.e. ti ∼ Ber(µ) is the
opinion of agent i on a particular issue. Then the probability that the majority is wrong
on this issue is Pr(
∑
i ti >
n
2 ), as stated by the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In our
case, ti ∼ Ber(Pi), where Pi differs among agents, and this case of independent
heterogeneous variables was covered in [13], which showed:
Pr(
∑
i
ti >
n
2
) = Pr(Zµ,n >
n
2
), (4)
where Zµ,n ∼ Bin(µ, n) and µ = 1n
∑
i Pi. Since the loss is additive along issues,
LB(n) = kPr(Zµ,n > n2 ).
We now turn to analyze the Proxy scenario. Assume w.l.o.g. that P1, P2, . . . , Pn
are sorted in increasing order. As k increases, Pi provides a good prediction of how
many 1’s and 0’s will be in si. This enables us to predict how inactive agents will select
their proxies: an agent with parameter Pi < 0.5 will almost always select agent 1 and
an agent with Pi > 0.5 will select agent n w.h.p.
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Lemma 14. For every position z < 0.5, Pr(∃j ∈ N s.t. ‖sj − z‖ < ‖s1 − z‖) <
n · e−bk. for some constant b. The same holds for z > 0.5 and sn.
Proof. Note that P1 < Pj for all j > 1. In addition, we denote a topic disagreement
indicator I(l)i,j =
r
s
(l)
i 6= s(l)j
z
. For each agent i with Pi < 0.5,∀j > 1,
Pr(‖si − sj‖ < ‖si − s[1]‖) = Pr(
k∑
l=1
I
(l)
i,j <
k∑
l=1
I
(l)
i,1)
= Pr(
k∑
l=1
I
(l)
i,j −
k∑
l=1
I
(l)
i,1 < 0)
define
q1 = Pi(1− P1) + (1− Pi)P1
q2 = Pi(1− Pj) + (1− Pi)Pj
Since Pi < 0.5, P1 > Pj ⇒ q1 > q2
X1 =
k∑
l=1
I
(l)
i,1 ∼ Binomial(k, q1)
X2 =
k∑
l=1
I
(l)
i,j ∼ Binomial(k, q2)
Pr(
k∑
l=1
I
(l)
i,1 <
k∑
l=1
I
(l)
i,j ) = Pr(X1 −X2 < 0)
Since k →∞ and q1, q2 are constants, a normal approximation to binomial distribution
will be sufficiently accurate for our purpose.
X1 ≈ Z1 ∼ N(kq1, kq1(1− q1))
X2 ≈ Z2 ∼ N(kq2, kq2(1− q2))
(Z1 − Z2) ∼ N(k(q1 − q2), k(q1(1− q1) + q2(1− q2)))
Pr(X1 −X2 < 0) ≈ Pr(Z1 − Z2 < 0)
= Φ(
0− k(q1 − q2)√
k(q1(1− q1) + q2(1− q2))
)
= Φ(
√
k(q1 − q2)
q1(1− q1) + q2(1− q2) ) = Φ(−a ·
√
k)
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Figure 5: The loss LQ(n) (in log scale), for distributions h = U [0, 2µ = 0.66] (left);
h = N(µ = 0.33, σ = 0.3) (right).
for some positive constant a. Note that for x < −1, Φ(x) < O(e− x22 ), thus
Pr(X1 > X2) < e
−bk for some constant b > 0. By the union bound, Pr (∃j ∈M s.t. ‖sj − z‖ < ‖s1 − z‖) ≤
(m− 1)Pr(X1 > X2) < me−bk.
This means that when there are many issues, all voters with z < 0.5 will cast their
votes to agent 1, thus w1 = Prz∼h(z < 0.5), wn = Prz∼h(z > 0.5). Hence one of
the agents {1, n} is effectively a dictator, depending on whether the median of h is
below or above 0.5. From now on we will assume that agent 1 is the dictator, as this
occurs with high probability as k → ∞ under most distributions with µ < 0.5. Thus
(for sufficiently large k),
‖mjP (SN )− x∗‖ = kmin
i∈N
(Pi) = kP1. (5)
To recap, under scenario B the majority mechanism is equivalent to unweighted
majority of a size n committee, while under scenario P , the mechanism is equivalent
to a dictatorship of the best expert (i.e., the most conformist agent).
Given a particular distribution h, we can calculate LP (n) analytically or numeri-
cally. E.g. when h = U [0, a] (note a = 2µ),
LP (n) = kEPn∼U(0,a)n [min
i∈N
Pi] =
ka
n+ 1
=
2µk
n+ 1
.
We can infer from Eqs. (4) and (5) that the proxy voting is beneficial in cases where
the best expert out-performs the majority decision on average. Specifically, when the
sample is small and/or the signal of agents is weak (µ is close to 0.5). See Fig. 5.
5.2 Strategic participation
In general there may be multiple equilibria that are difficult to characterize, and whose
outcomes mj(SM ) may be very different from x∗. However we can show that for
a sufficiently high k, there is (w.h.p) only one equilibrium outcome in each of the
mechanisms mjB+L,mjP+L.
Intuitively, the reason is as follows. For every agent i ∈ N there is w.h.p an issue
for which she is pivotal, and thus the only equilibrium in scenarioB+Lwill beM = N
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(w.h.p). In scenario P+L, the entire weight is distributed between the active agents
with the lowest and highest Pi. This means that the best agent is always pivotal and thus
active. Regardless of which other agents become active, we get that mjP+L(SN ) =
mj(SM ,wM ) = s1 = mj
P (SN ). The probability that any other equilibrium exists
and affects the loss goes to zero.
Basic setting For any M ⊆ N , denote by YM the event that set M is an equilib-
rium in the game mjB+L(SN ). We bound the probability that N is not the unique
equilibrium.
Lemma 15. Pr(¬YN ∨ (∃M ( N,YM )) < e2n− k2n . Note that for k  n · 2n+1 the
bound tends to 0.
Proof. For a binary vector q ∈ {0, 1}n, we denote by Zq the event that for some issue
j ≤ k, qi = s(j)i for all i ∈ N . We also denote Z∗ =
⋃
q∈{0,1}n Zq.
We first argue that Z∗ entails both YN and ¬YM for anyM ( N . Consider first the
set N , and voter i ∈ N . If n is odd consider some vector q where qi = 1 and all other
voters split evenly between 0 and 1. Since Z∗ holds, there is an issue j s.t. qi′ = s
(j)
i′
for all i′ ∈ N . We get that mj(N)(j) = 1 but mj(N \ {i})(j) = 0, i.e. i is pivotal and
will thus not quit. If n is even we proceed in a similar way except qi = 0 and all of N
split evenly between 0 and 1.
For any smaller set M , consider some i ∈ N \M , where |M | = m. If m is even
we consider a vector q where qi = 1 and and all voters in M split evenly between 0
and 1. We get that there is an issue j where mj(M)(j) = 0 but mj(N ∪ {i})(j) = 1,
i.e. i is pivotal and will join (M is not stable). If m is odd we proceed in a similar way
except qi = 0 and all of M ∪ {i} split evenly between 0 and 1.
It is left to bound Pr(¬Z∗). Indeed, for any q and j ≤ k, the probability that
q = s(j) is exactly 2−n, and thus
Pr(¬Z∗) ≤
∑
q
Pr(¬Zq) =
∑
q∈{0,1}n
∏
j≤k
Pr(s(j) 6= Zq)
=
∑
q∈{0,1}n
∏
j≤k
(1− 2−n) =
∑
q∈{0,1}n
(1− 2−n)k = 2n(1− 2−n)k
≤ 2ne−k/2n < e2n− k2n .
Any other equilibrium occurs with negligible probability, and has a bounded effect
on the loss.
Corollary 16. As k →∞, the probability thatN is the unique equilibrium ofmjB+L(SN )
tends to 1. In particular, |LB+L(n)− LB(n)| k→∞→ 0.
19
Proxy voting From Lemma 14, we know that for every setM ⊆ N , the most extreme
voter j = 1 gets the votes of all inactive voters with Pi < 0.5, and in particular is
pivotal (w.h.p., as k is large enough). Thus voter 1 is active in any equilibrium, and is
in fact a dictator as in the non-strategic scenario.
Finally, since we assume that the median of h is less than 0.5, j = 1 is a dictator.
As no other voter in N is pivotal on any issue, they all become inactive. Thus under
the same assumptions of Lemma 14:
Corollary 17. As k → 0, the probability that M = {1} is the unique equilibrium of
mjS(SN ) tends to 1. In particular, |LP+L(n)− LP (n)| k→∞→ 0.
5.3 Empirical Evaluation
We evaluate proxy voting on real data to avoid two unrealistic assumptions in our
theoretical model: that the number of issues k is very large, and that i’s votes on all
issues are i.i.d.
We examine several data sets from PrefLib [17]: The first few datasets are Approval
ballots of French presidential 2002 elections over 16 candidates in several regions (ED-
26). We treat each candidate is an “issue” and each voter can either agree with the
issue (approve this candidate) or disagree. Pi is the fraction of issues on which voter i
disagrees with the majority.
We also considered two datasets of ordinal preferences: sushi preferences (ED-14)
and AGH course selection (AD-9). The translation to a binary matrix is by checking for
each pair of alternatives (α, β) whether α is preferred over β. This leaves us with 45
and 36 binary issues in the sushi and AGH datasets, respectively.3 A subset of k = 15
issues were sampled at each iteration in order to get results that are more robust (we
thus get a “sushi distribution” and “AGH distribution” instead of a single dataset).
We first consider the weight distribution among agents (Fig. 6). The weight of
agents is decreasing in Pi, meaning that agents with higher agreement with the majority
opinion gets more followers, with the best agents getting a significantly higher weight.
This is related to the theoretical result that the best expert get > 0.5 weight, but is
much less extreme. Also there is no weight concentration on the worst agent (this can
be explained by the ‘Anna Karenina principle’,4 as each bad agent errs on different
issues). In other words, allowing proxies does not result in a dictatorship of the best
active agent, but in meritocracy of the better active agents.
This leads us to expect better performance than the theoretical prediction when
comparing Proxy voting to the Basic setting. Indeed, Fig. 6 (right) and Fig. 7 show that
in all datasets LP (n) < LB(n) except for very small samples in the French election
datasets. This gap increases quickly with the sample size.
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6 Discussion and Related Work
Our results, summarized in Table 1, provide a strong support for proxy voting when
agents’ positions are placed on a line, especially when the Median mechanism is in
use. In contrast, when positions are (binary) multi-dimensional, proxy voting might
concentrate too much power in the hands of a single proxy, and increase the error.
However we also showed that on actual data this rarely happens and analyzed the rea-
sons. These findings corroborate our hypothesis that proxy voting can improve repre-
sentation across several domains. We are looking forward to study the effect of proxy
voting in other domains, including common voting functions that use voters’ rankings.
Proxy voting, and our model in particular, are tightly related to the proportional
representation problem, dealing with how to select representatives from a large popu-
lation. A recent paper by Skowron [24] considers the selection of representatives who
then use voting to decide on issues that affect the society. In our case, selection is
3Note that Hamming distance between agents’ positions equals the Kendal-Tau distance between their
ordinal preferences.
4“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way” [26].
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Rule: Median Mean Majority (k →∞)
with many issues
Proxy better Yes f SP + symmetric No
for any SN n = 2
LP < LB Always f Uniform depends on the best
LP  LB f symmetric (* most f ) f Uniform (* most f ) agent (* real data)
unique equilibrium always f Uniform always
of gP+L
LB+L ≥ LB always always always
LP+L ≤ LP always f Uniform (* some SP f ) always
Table 1: A summary of our results. The first three lines show the effect of proxy voting
when all agents are active. Results marked by (*) are obtained by simulations. The
bottom lines summarize the effect of strategic voting with lazy bias.
random as suggested in [20], and representatives are weighted proportionally to the
number of voters that pick them as proxies, as originally suggested by Tullock [27]. It
is interesting to note that political systems where public representatives are selected at
random (“sortition”) have been applied in practice [8]. Our results suggest that such
systems could be improved by weighting the representatives after their selection. Set-
ting the weight proportionally to the number of followers seems natural, but it is an
open question whether there are even better ways to set these weights.
Closest to out work is a model by Green-Armytage [12], where voters select proxies
and use the Median rule to decide on each of several continuous issues. Decisions are
evaluated based on their square distance from the “optimal” one. However even if the
entire population votes, the outcome may be suboptimal, as Green-Armytage assumes
people perceive their own position (as well as others’ position) with some error. He then
focuses on how various options for delegating one’s vote may contribute to reducing
her expressive loss, i.e. the distance from her true opinion to her ballot. In contrast,
expressive losses do not play a roll in our model, where the sources of inaccuracy are
small samples and/or strategic behavior.
Alger [1] considers a model with a fixed set of political representatives on an inter-
val (as in our model), but focuses mainly on the ideological considerations of the voters
and the political implications rather than on mathematical analysis. Our very positive
results on the use of proxies in the Median mechanism support Alger’s conclusions,
albeit under a somewhat different model of voters incentives. Alger also points out that
proxy voting significantly reduces the amount of communication involved in collecting
ballots on many issues.
Other models allow chains of voters who use each other as proxies [11, 6], or social
influence that effectively increases the weight of some voters [2].
Indeed, we believe that a realistic model of proxy voting would have to take into
account such topological and social factors in addition to statistics and incentives. E.g.,
[2] shows the benefits of a bounded degree, which in our model may allow a way to
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bound excessive weights. Social networks may also be a good way to capture corre-
lations in voters’ preferences [22], and can thus be used to extend our results beyond
independent voters.
Strategic behavior We showed that most of our results hold when participation is
strategic. What if voters (either active or inactive) could mis-report their position?
Note that inactive voters have no reason to lie under the Median and the Majority
mechanisms, due to standard strategyproofness properties. However active agents may
be able to affect the outcome by changing the partition of followers. We can also
consider more nuanced strategic behavior, for example where an agent also cares about
her number of followers regardless of the outcome. More generally, strategic consid-
erations under proxy voting combine challenges from strategic voting with those of
strategic candidacy [14, 9], and would require a careful review of the assumptions of
each model.
Other open questions include the effect of proxy voting on diversity, fairness, and
participation. It is argued that diverse representatives often reach better outcomes [16],
and fairness attracts much attention in the analysis of voting and other multiagent sys-
tems [4, 29, 7]. The effect on participation and engagement may also be quite involved,
since allowing voters to use a proxy may increase the participation level of some who
would otherwise not be represented, but on the other hand may lower the incentive to
vote actively, thereby reducing overall engagement of the society.
Finally, the future of proxy voting depends on the development and penetration of
novel online voting tools and social apps, such as those mentioned in the Introduction.
We hope that sharing of data and insights will promote research on the topic, and set
new challenges for mechanism design.
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